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Although the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler (1952) is still largely 
unknown in the Netherlands, he is without doubt one of the most impor-
tant continental thinkers of today. His voluminous and rapidly expanding 
œuvre is gaining increased attention within academia and his three vol-
ume magnum opus Technics and Time has become available recently in 
English and German translations. The central idea guiding his work is 
that the human being is marked by an ‘originary absence of origin’ [défaut 
d’orgine], a fundamental lack of qualities that makes him into an acciden-
tal being originally in need of technical prostheses and therefore funda-
mentally constituted and conditioned by technics. For Stiegler, humanity 
is co-extensive with technics.  
Stiegler is in many respects a fairly traditional continental philosopher, a 
heir to Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida and deeply 
affiliated with the traditions of phenomenology, psychoanalysis and de-
construction. The originality of his work resides first of all in a Heideg-
gerian-like rethinking of the entire Western philosophical tradition on the 
basis of its systematically forgotten technical condition. Whereas Heideg-
ger criticized metaphysics for its forgetfulness of being, Stiegler charges 
philosophy, including Heidegger himself, with forgetting its technical 
condition of possibility and that means its irretrievable accidentality.  
One the other hand, however, Stiegler’s philosophical enterprise can also 
be seen as a continuation of the project of critical theory, of its social cri-
tique, its critique of political economy and its critique of the culture in-
dustry. This can be identified as the ‘Marxist’ strand of his work. Most 
remarkably, it is on the basis of his techno-critical project that Stiegler 
provides a sociopolitical critique of contemporary capitalist and postmod-
ern society. This society suffers from what he calls a state of generalized 
proletarianization.  
Proletarianization, Stiegler argues with Gilbert Simondon and Karl Marx, 
consists essentially in the loss of knowledge and know-how (savoir-faire) 
in individuals and collectives. Whereas nineteenth-century capitalism 
proletarianized workers by delegating their knowledge and know-how to 
machines, reducing them to labor power, twentieth-century capitalism 
has proletarianized consumers by depriving them of their own ways of life 
and massively replacing them with preformatted and standardized ‘life-
styles’ fabricated and marketed on a worldwide scale by global corpora-
tions exclusively driven by profit. In today’s service economies, consumers 
are ‘discharged’ of the burden as well as the responsibility of shaping their 
own lives and are reduced to units of buying power controlled by market-
ing techniques. They have lost their ‘knowledge-how-to-live' (savoir-
vivre) and become ultimately deprived of the joy of life (joie de vivre). The 
much-heard slogan that our contemporary societies are ‘knowledge socie-
ties’ is a patent lie, according to Stiegler. In fact, today’s cognitive capital-
ism implies the systematic destruction of knowledge and the knowing 
subject.  
The phenomenon of proletarianization, that is put on the agenda of phi-
losophical reflection again by Stiegler, is not something that came up first 
with the Industrial Revolution. In fact, it forms a constant threat to the 
human as a being that continuously evolves through processes of techni-
cal exteriorization that must necessarily be accompanied by processes of 
interiorization and appropriation of technical prostheses and procedures. 
This is particularly true since the exteriorization of memory and cogni-
tion in so-called mnemotechnologies like writing and printing. What is 
characteristic of our contemporary age, according to Stiegler, is the sys-
tematic industrialization of human memory and cognition through digi-
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tal technologies, a process with dramatic implications for individual hu-
man psyches as well as collectives. In our hyperindustrial societies, even 
the life of the mind is thoroughly technicized and industrialized and this 
happens in the context of an increasingly totalitarian capitalism.  
It is the systematic annexation of the new technical milieus of the mind 
(first of all the network of digital information and communication tech-
nologies: Internet) by capitalism that is the principal cause of the cognitive 
and emotional proletarianization that affects all strata of contemporary 
society. Capitalism today exploits the mnemotechnical milieu for captur-
ing the attention and desires of populations for the purpose of promoting 
consumption and creating consumer subjects. This phenomenon is called 
psychopower by Stiegler, in analogy to Michel Foucault’s notion of bio-
power. Its ultimate result is the destruction of the libido and with it the 
sublimatory capacities of humanity, which lie at the basis of every civiliza-
tion. Today’s cognitive and consumer capitalism is first of all a capitalism 
focused on the control of libidinal energy – of consumers and employees 
as well as financiers. Criticizing it presupposes the development of a cri-
tique of libidinal economy. 
In this interview, Stiegler talks about today’s processes of proletarianiza-
tion and addresses some of the pernicious consequences of capital’s ex-
ploitation of the technical milieu of the mind, among them the many 
psychopathologies and addictive behavior patterns that agonize ever more 
people, especially since the rise of the purely speculative, short-term based 
finance capitalism invented by the neoliberals and the neoconservatives. 
By subjecting technological innovation completely to the logic of the 
market, the so called ‘conservative revolution’ led by Thatcher and 
Reagan has engendered a cultural and spiritual regression of unprece-
dented magnitude, transforming the whole of society into a machine for 
profit maximization and creating a state of ‘systemic carelessness’ and 
‘systemic stupidity’ on a global scale. 
Notwithstanding his rather bleak diagnosis of contemporary society, 
Stiegler is not pessimistic with regard to the future. Whereas today’s capi-
talism is headed for destruction, it is precisely in the digitalized networks 
through which it tries to control the populations that a new kind of 
economy is emerging, one that is not only inventing new modes of pro-
duction like open source and peer-to-peer, but that is also slowly creating 
a new economy of desire that could lead to the invention of new ways of 
life, new modes of individual and collective existence. A new society could 
arise on the same technological base that is now still predominantly de-
stroying the social bonds. The digital networks might be the prime cata-
lysts in the transformation from today’s consumer society into what he 
calls a ‘society of contribution’. In this context he talks in this interview 
about technologies in terms of pharmaka (a term derived from Plato and 
from his teacher Derrida) that can act both as a poison, destroying social-
ity and proletarianizing human existence, as well as a medicine, producing 
social ties and deproletarianzing human existence. 
‘My books want to serve struggles [servir des luttes]’, Stiegler writes in one 
of his prefaces. The struggles he refers to are struggles in the context of a 
‘battle for the mind’, a battle in which the forces of a capitalism that has 
become nihilistic stand opposed to a humanity that needs to develop a 
new, global consciousness and collectivity in order to challenge the global 
multicrisis that is closing in upon it. Philosophy, according to Stiegler, 
should engage itself in the global struggle for the mind against a capitalist 
system that is systematically degrading and brutalizing human existence, 
destroying desire, intelligence and the joie de vivre. And philosophers 
should focus their attention on the digital network technologies, which 
are still predominantly factors of the erosion of consciousness and social-
ity but which could – and should – become a new technical milieu for the 
life of the mind, for a renewed spiritual and intellectual culture (in 
Stiegler’s terms: a libidinal economy). With this enormous task in mind, 
Stiegler and some colleagues have established Ars Industrialis, an interna-
tional association for the promotion of an industrial politics of spirit, 
based in Paris. Existing since 2005, it organizes conferences, debates, semi-
nars and international meetings and it has published two manifestos and 
two books as well.1
BS: Bernard Stiegler 
PL: Pieter Lemmens 
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PL: Let’s start with your general position within the larger field of philoso-
phy of technology, notwithstanding the fact that you don’t consider 
yourself a philosopher of technology in the strict sense of the term. In the 
philosophy of technology one distinguishes roughly between two oppos-
ing views about the relationship between technology and society: on the 
one hand technological determinism, the thesis that it is technology and 
technological change which determines the structure of society and/or 
culture, and on the other hand social or cultural determinism, the thesis 
that it is society and/or culture that determines the shape and character of 
technologies and technological change. This last view, which is held by 
the many Latour- and Callon-inspired social-constructivists in the Neth-
erlands, is also referred to as the ‘social shaping of technology’ thesis. The 
first view is held for instance by Jacques Ellul but is also attributed some-
times to Marx. 
Another broad opposition is that between the so-called autonomy theory 
of technology (also known as technological substantivism), and the in-
strumentalist view of technology. The first holds to the idea that technol-
ogy and technological change have a logic of their own and are outside of 
human control and decision, the second claims that technology is a neu-
tral means used by autonomously acting human beings for a variety of 
ends, to which technologies are indifferent. This view is also sometimes 
referred to as the humanist view. Substantivism is most often associated 
with Heidegger and Ellul, whereas liberal conceptions of technology are 
generally perceived as being instrumental and typically subscribing to 
social and/or economic determinism. How would you characterize your 
view with respect to these two schematic oppositions? 
BS: Well, in fact my principal sources here are André Leroi-Gourhan, a 
paleoanthropologist, Gilbert Simondon, a philosopher of technology and 
Bertrand Gille, a historian of technology. My point of view is that the 
separation between the human and technics, and between society and 
technics or the technical system is completely artificial.  
It is important to understand that technology is a process, an evolution-
ary process. What is technics, or technology, or technicity? It is a new 
form of life. A very specific form of life, for until the onset of anthropo-
genesis, forms of life were transformed exclusively through a genetic 
process of transformation, that is to say through sexual differentiation 
and the relationship between sexualized organisms, which is the case for 
plants and animals. But about three million years ago there occurred a 
fundamental change in this process of transformation within the human 
species, due to the appearance of a new system of inheritance based not on 
the transmission of genes but of technical artefacts. So with respect to 
anthropogenesis, we are not talking about a Darwinist situation anymore. 
But neither is it a Lamarckist situation. It is something completely differ-
ent, due to this apparition of a third memory2. 
Now to answer your question, it is completely artificial to ask, what is the 
relationship of the human to technics? Because the human is technics. 
Humanity cannot even be understood without technics. Take the exam-
ple of the ant in the anthill. It is impossible to understand the ant without 
the anthill. If you don’t see it within the anthill, it is impossible to under-
stand it. And you need to consider the relationship with the other ants as 
well, because it is a social animal. And it is the same when you have, for 
example, a savage child which has not learned to speak and to walk, etcet-
era. Such a child is not really human. It is a potentiality of humanity, but 
it’s not human. It is a very strange being between animality and human-
ity. So, it is artificial to ask, for example, what is determining human life: is 
it the psychic apparatus of the individual, is it the social organization or is 
it the technical organization? It is completely artificial because you don’t 
have a psychic individual without a society, and you don’t have a society 
without technics.  
PL: Ok, but you also claim that there is a primacy of technology. 
BS: It is not exactly a primacy. It must be understood as a ‘disadjustment’ 
[desajustément] between the social system and the technical system, be-
cause you are in a process. What is a process? It is a dynamic system. You 
don’t have a process without a dynamic system. And in a dynamic system 
you have phases, and when you have a phase, you always have a counter 
phase. That is necessary. If not, then you don’t have a dynamic system. 
Now, it is true that technics is always in excess with respect to the society 
in which it appears. This is the reason I said that technics is always phar-
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macological. It is always a pharmakon, because it is always creating a dis-
equilibrium in the society in which it is developed and by which it is de-
veloped.  
PL: And the creation of this disequilibrium, is that what you call the poi-
soning character of the pharmakon? Could you elaborate upon this no-
tion of the pharmakon, which has become one of the key concepts of 
your work, and could you explain what you mean with the pharmacol-
ogical nature of technology?  
BS: The pharmacological nature of technology means both its poisoning 
and its curative character. It is both poisoning and curing. At its first ap-
pearance, however, it is poisoning. It becomes curative when you have 
what I call the second moment of epochality of technics, le redoublement 
epochale [the process of appropriation of a new technical system by soci-
ety and the development of new modes of psychic and collective indi-
viduation based on this technical system; PL]. So, the problem of disad-
justment is what was called by Shakespeare ‘the time is out of joint’. What 
is creating this being out of joint? That is the question. And my answer is: 
the process of technical exteriorization.  
For instance: at this very moment I am exteriorizing myself. Speaking 
with you, I am exteriorizing myself. And that means: I am technicizing 
myself. If I talk with you, I create new words. I very much like to create 
new words [laughter]. A word is also a new technical object. The opposi-
tion between technics and speech for me is completely artificial.  
Now, for a human being, to live is to individuate oneself. How am I indi-
viduating myself? By exteriorizing myself. And in the same way, I am inte-
riorizing myself, because when I speak to you, I am listening to what I say, 
so I interiorize myself. Now this process of exteriorization-interiorization 
is the originary process of psychic and social individuation. So you can see 
very clearly that at the beginning of psychic activity you always already 
have technics, i.e., technical individuation. Now, you might not be a pro-
fessional speaker, like me, but you might for instance produce flint stones. 
Suppose you are a prehistoric man and you are producing stone tools. It is 
exactly the same thing. That is what I try to describe in my first book 
Technics and Time. The Fault of Epimetheus. When pre-historic man is 
producing flint stones, thereby exteriorizing his experience, he is in fact 
transforming his brain, his psyche. 
PL: So the stone is reflecting what he has exteriorized back to himself, 
acting like a kind of idea or a model? 
BS: Yes, and it is a concept. In paleoanthropology we call that a concept, 
precisely. Because we say: there is a concept of the flint stone. Now your 
question was technological determinism or not. Well, there is no techno-
logical determinism. What there is is a technological condition. There is a 
conditional situation in which you have what I call a general organology: 
there are always three terms involved in the transformation of the hu-
man, which are the psychic, the technical and the social. And you have a 
tendency of the technics to change always beyond the barriers, beyond 
the limits of the social group.  
This has always been the case. When you read for example what was writ-
ten by Leroi-Gourhan about the Amer-Indian people when they use, for 
example, a racket for clearing snow. He talks about the ‘technical group’, 
because in a small tribe like the Amer-Indian people you have a small 
group within the larger group, which is the group of technicians. And he 
writes that the technicians of this group of Indians tend to make connec-
tions with other technicians of other groups, to create new techniques 
together, which then disturb and sometimes even destroy their own 
groups. So they have a problem of disequilibrium. And then the society 
produces an immune system as response, in the sense of a counter-
tendency. But whether the countertendency is after it or before it, is not 
the right question. You have the tendency at the very moment when you 
have the countertendency. Because, as Nietzsche said, you cannot have a 
force without a counterforce. So it is absolutely not interesting to ask: 
where is the beginning, what is the first moment? There is no first mo-
ment. 
PL: So there is no determinism by either society or technics… 
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BS: Indeed. And here Gilbert Simondon is extremely fruitful, because he 
furnished a very interesting concept which is the ‘pre-individual’. In the 
pre-individual, you don’t have the separation between the technical, the 
psychic and the social. But this argument also appears in Aristotle. When 
he said – I think at the beginning of Peri psycheos, or De Anima – that a 
dialectician separates form and matter, but that it’s in fact impossible to 
separate them in reality, he saw this already. So I think it is an artefact to 
try to find the causal origin. We must think from the very first beginning 
in terms of a dynamic system, in which you have phases, and what is im-
portant – but very difficult – is to describe the relationships between the 
different instances of the phases. 
PL: That is what you intend with a general organology? 
BS: Yes, and it is very difficult to describe, because it is always changing. 
PL: Ok, thank you. I would like to ask you now about the relationship 
between the process of technical exteriorization and what you call prole-
tarianization in your latest books. I find that a very interesting concept, as 
well as the opposing concept of deproletarianization. You kind of rehabili-
tate this originally Marxian concept. Our postmodern societies, you claim, 
are characterized by a state of generalized proletarianization and so the 
most important political and cultural project of the future will be a proc-
ess of deproletarianization. In this respect you refer to phenomena like 
Open Source and Free Software as prefigurations of this process.  
Now, returning to the relationship of proletarianization with the process 
of technical exteriorization: in your diagnosis something goes wrong to-
day with the ‘adjustment’ [ajustement] of society to technological change, 
that is to say with the societal appropriation of technological innovations. 
First of all, probably, because innovation is speeding up every day, second, 
because it is completely dominated and exploited by capitalism, by the 
economic system. Can you explain that a bit? What is really causing this 
chronic disadjustment and disorientation? Is it capital (capitalism), or is it 
technics? In short, can you elaborate a bit upon the connection between 
technical exteriorization and proletarianization, and that in relationship 
to capitalism and the current disorientation? 
BS: Firstly, the process of proletarianization didn’t begin with the Indus-
trial Revolution. That is the reason why I try to show that the first thinker 
of proletarianization is in fact Plato. More strongly even, the process of 
proletarianization marks the beginning of humankind. Because, what is 
proletarianization? It is first of all the exteriorization of knowledge in 
technics. It begins with technics. Now the problem is, what is the gain of 
the process of exteriorization for humanity? Is it creating heteronomy or 
autonomy? For example: if you are using a technique which is producing 
free time for you to do another thing, for instance developing your skills 
and individuating yourself, then the result of this exteriorization is an 
intensification of your individuation. If you use the technique of writing 
for example, not for creating a dependency and heteronomy in the youth 
of Athens, like the Sophists did who appear in Plato’s dialogues, but on the 
contrary for taking care of one’s self3, for creating the academy, for pro-
ducing philosophy books, etcetera, then one individuates oneself with and 
through those books. Plato never says that, of course, but that is what he 
means. 
PL: Plato did not like books. 
BS: No he didn’t like books but he produced books! [laughter] And all the 
people of the academy produced books. Aristotle produced books as well. 
All the scholars of the academy were producers of books. Léon Robin, a 
French specialist of Greek philosophy, said that the academy produced 
only small books for explaining what the philosophy of Plato was which 
was heard everywhere in Athens. So Plato was doing exactly the same 
thing as the Sophists. He argues exactly like Immanuel Kant did in Was ist 
Aufklärung? Kant wrote: you can read my books, but only if you don’t use 
them for proletarianizing yourself. He doesn’t say it like that of course, 
but that is what he had in mind when he said: if you read my books in 
order to avoid thinking for yourself, out of laziness for instance, you are 
proletarianizing yourself. He does not use the word ‘proletarianize’, he 
says ‘minorize’ [mineur],but he means the same. Reading books without 
reflecting upon them and critically engaging with them leads to minority, 
not to maturity.  
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This question of proletarianization is in fact at the origin of philosophy 
and it is a question of autonomization versus heteronomization. Now, my 
point of view is that pure autonomy does not exist. My own position – 
and it is very close to Derrida’s – is that there is never an autonomy with-
out a link to a heteronomy, i.e., with a link to technics. Because for exam-
ple, in Greek society people were creating their autonomy through a 
therapeutic use of the pharmakon of writing, i.e., of the technique of writ-
ing. So, autonomy is always a limited autonomy, never a pure autonomy. 
Now, all my questions are extremely classical in fact. But, with a very 
small change, in that it is impossible to oppose autonomy and heteron-
omy.  
Now, in coming back to your question, what is happening today, to us? 
Well, it is the consequence of what started at the end of the Seventies in 
England with Margaret Thatcher, who proclaimed that from now on, we 
don’t need the state anymore. Instead we let the market organize the ap-
propriation of technologies. And why was this extremely toxic and nega-
tive for the future of humanity? Because it was the whole planet which 
transformed the policies and the economy after that. It is not so much 
catastrophic because of the end of the welfare state, which is a question 
that is very important for me, but not the main question.  
The main question is that the state has been for a very long time – already 
at the time of the Greek polis – an organization for the appropriation of 
technical exteriorization, i.e., for the adoption of new technologies in a 
way that was producing what I call a libidinal economy, i.e., a collective 
libidinal economy producing a superego, an ego ideal, etcetera. It created 
a kind of equilibrium, a psychic equilibrium, in which you had, for exam-
ple, the Greek people inventing the skholeion, that is a place for teaching. 
It was the same with the schools of the Romans. And in Christian society 
it was the organization of the Vatican, the Papists. And after that it was 
Luther who explained that laymen can read the Bible, but they need an 
organization as well, which was the Reformation of Christianity. Later, 
after the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, you had the 
organization of the public sphere, of the lay sphere, of teaching and public 
education, etcetera. And it was always agreed upon that it was impossible 
to submit this activity to the economy. But in 1979 in Great Britain, Ms. 
Thatcher said: now we will submit all these things to the economy. And 
at the same moment Reagan did the same in America. And after that Mit-
terand in his way, in social democracy. But everybody did in fact, the 
whole world did the same. Even in Soviet and Chinese society. 
PL: Why was that? And why was it so successful?  
BS: There are a lot of reasons. The first one is that American and English 
capitalism seemed extremely strong at that moment. Nevertheless, 
Thatcher and Reagan knew already that it was finished with controlling 
production. You know that in 1979 Liverpool was in ruins. The whole of 
the economy in England was a catastrophe. It was also very bad in Amer-
ica. It was the beginning of the exportation of the production of, for ex-
ample, the electronic industries to Japan and Korea, and after that to 
Thailand, then to China. This was the deindustrialization of the West. 
And the strategy of Thatcher and Reagan was: we now need to produce a 
new type of capitalism, which was a financialized capitalism, being purely 
speculative. Not a capitalism of investment, but a capitalism of specula-
tion. It was the creation of what led, in the end, to people like Bernie 
Madoff… as the norm of capitalism. Before that, Madoff would be consid-
ered a gangster. But after that he was not a gangster, he was a policeman, 
because he was the chairman of the Nasdaq! 
PL: You speak about the ‘mafiazation’ of capitalism. 
BS: It is a mafiazation. Now this ‘conservative revolution’ was changing 
something extremely important, which is the socialization of technics. 
Because, formerly, the socialization of technics was not done by market-
ing. It was carried out by a lot of different organizations, in general public 
organizations, but also religious organizations. Religion has been ex-
tremely important in the history of the West but at the beginning of the 
Eighties it was gone. And we now say that the state is what has been…  
PL: Well, the neoliberal state is a strong state, one could argue, in certain 
respects at least.  
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BS: Yes, but it is a state only for security and for controlling the pathologi-
cal behavior of people. It is only military and police. 
PL: Yes, but for instance, it is also involved in the disciplining of the popu-
lation to adapt to the market, in encouraging citizens to become self-
entrepreneurs, in installing competition everywhere, in turning the 
whole of society into a market, etcetera. It is in a sense a strong state, not a 
state that is withdrawing itself. 
BS: Yes. But my problem is not to qualify the traits of the state; it is to 
qualify the goals of the state. What is a strong state? At the moment here 
in France there is a proposal for privatizing the police. And you might 
know for instance that there is also a project, I think in Germany, for pri-
vatizing the military, like in America. The Iraq war was already a war 
fought with private armies. It is a return to the situation of the seven-
teenth century, to the age of mercenaries. Now, are we talking about the 
state here? When you say that the state is very strong, what if the state is 
only one man, for example Sarkozy or Berlusconi, who gives money to a 
privatized police? Is that really a state? No, it is mafia. The mafia is very 
strong, not the state. What is the state? Here I have a problem with Der-
rida, Deleuze, Foucault, and all those French philosophers, who are al-
ways criticizing the state. 
PL: Marx did too. 
BS: And Marx too, yes. But they do not see what the state today really is. 
When Foucault criticized the state and the preparation of neoliberal ide-
ology, at that moment functioning in France, he was in fact completely 
forgetting another role of the state, which is precisely how to deal with 
the technological pharmakon. How to transform the pharmakon, which 
is poisonous, in a practice of education, etcetera. This used to be a state 
policy. And this is extremely important.  
The question today for me is not the end of capitalism or the return of the 
communist horizon. Today we have to create a new industrial model. 
This new industrial model will possibly produce a new political organiza-
tion, and an economical organization which may not be capitalist. But it is 
not at all sure, and it is not my problem today. It is possible for example to 
produce a cooperative capitalism. I know of people exploiting capital in a 
cooperative way. It still is capitalism, because you have ownership of the 
means of production by a collective, but this collective is proprietary. It is 
not a collectivization in the communist sense. It is capitalist. But it is a 
new form of capitalism.  
The question of capitalism is the opposition between capital and work. 
And this opposition between capital and work is an opposition through 
property. Now if we change the law of property, for example by sharing 
the sources of software code in Free Software, we are changing something 
very crucial. Is it capitalism or not? I don’t know… and I don’t care. I pre-
fer to do it, and to ask only afterwards. When I say I don’t care, I don’t say 
it is not a very important question, but we are in a situation of emergency 
today. We have to do things, not only to think. We have to propose 
things. We don’t have time for discussions about whether it will be capital-
ism or not. We need to create a new situation. The question, for instance, 
is to go to the investment banks and ask them in what they want to in-
vest. Not to speculate but to invest. And to tell them: you have a lot of 
money, you don’t know what to do with this money, you must invest in 
this new system, the future is there. If I say to them it is the end of capital-
ism [BS laughs], they will not invest. The question today is: what is the 
new industrial model?  
PL: You argue that the open source and free software movements in the 
software industry are a kind of harbinger of this new model, i.e., prefigu-
rations of what you also call an ‘economy of contribution’. And you sug-
gest that these movements must be understood as engaged in a process of 
deproletarianization. Could you explain that a bit more. And could you 
also explain why you have put your hopes so much in these, in my view 
still pretty marginal practices, especially Free Software. Open source is big 
nowadays of course, at least in the software sector, but it represents a kind 
of pragmatization, even capitalization and thereby a betrayal of the prin-
ciples of Free Software. And as such it remains immanent to capitalism. 
What is your ‘pharmacological hope’, so to speak, with respect to these 
practices?  
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BS: That is a very important question, but difficult, very difficult. Firstly, I 
think it’s not hope. Well, it is hope, that’s clear, but it is also a rationality. 
Now, today capitalism has become irrational, completely irrational. There 
is a discussion now going on in Switzerland – that was said this morning 
on the radio in France – about the regulation of the irrationality of the 
financialized market. We have had a discourse from Thatcher and Reagan 
up until Chirac and Sarkozy, that talked about the ‘rationality of market’. 
Everybody agreed that market rationality was the ultimate rationality. 
But what is this market rationality? The market is rational because it is all 
about calculation, computation. But that is a completely stupid under-
standing of what rationality is, because rationality is precisely, to speak 
with Kant, that which is not calculable. Understanding is calculation, but 
rationality isn’t. Rationality, on the contrary, is infinitization. So it is 
completely stupid to say that the market is rational. But those people who 
hailed the rationality of the market are completely incompetent. They 
know nothing about the history of thought.  
Now, here is a new rationality for me. Why? Well, for example, if you talk 
with a manager of a human resources department in a company today. If 
the person with whom you talk is honest, he will say to you: I have a big 
problem: the workers do not want to work, the consumers do not want 
to consume [BS laughs], the managers do not want to manage, etcetera. 
Why? Because there is no pleasure produced anymore by the system. I’ve 
thought a lot about consumption and I claim that consumers today are 
addicted. When you ask them: what do you think about consumption, 
they say it is very bad. There was an inquiry published two or three days 
ago in the USA by Juliet Schorr, who asked the American people: what do 
you think about consumption? Well, they said it is bad for us and for 
America. Eighty-one percent of the people said that – in America! 
PL: But they are nevertheless doing it. 
BS: Yes, and that is because they are intoxicated. They are addicts. If you 
ask a junkie, one who has been a junkie for ten years: what do you think 
of heroin, he or she will say that it is extremely bad. It is that which is ex-
plained at the beginning of Naked Lunch, the famous book by William 
Burroughs, why you must not use heroin. The author says: I use it, but it 
is because I cannot stop anymore. I would like to stop but it is impossible. 
Now capitalism is confronted with a very similar problem. It has a lot of 
intoxicated people to manage and it is impossible to manage intoxicated 
people. When Burroughs says, I could kill my mother for my heroin, it is 
the same question now for example in France with Sarkozy when he says 
with respect to the young people of the poor, in the Banlieus, that it is 
impossible to control them. Yes, it is impossible. And at the moment it is 
only in the Banlieus, but within five or ten years from now, it will be eve-
rybody who is uncontrollable … 
PL: You talk about today’s control societies (Deleuze) becoming uncon-
trollable societies in the second volume of Mécréance et Discrédit. Les 
sociétés incontrolâbles. Could you say more about that? You see that 
really coming? 
BS: I think so. If you look at China for example, or in Japan, there are a lot 
of problems now with the youth. And the only way it is being fought is by 
producing a hyperproletarianization and a chemical one, through drugs. 
You know that in America fifteen percent of the youth is using Ritalin, 
Prozac, etcetera. And we have the same problem with respect to work. 
Hyperactivity of workers for example. I was a manager of a big company 
once. For five years I had one-thousand people to manage. And I saw very 
well how they were in fact not at all happy with their work, but were only 
producing a kind of hyperactivity… creating a kind of hypnosis, in order 
to forget to think, to forget their concerns, their problems. And they had 
a lot of problems. Maybe you have read the book Le nouvel esprit du capi-
talisme by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello. They say that the final result 
of the development of this new type of capitalism is to destroy the cou-
ples, the family. Because when the husband needs to go to work in this 
factory and the wife in another, you destroy the family. But if you destroy 
the family, you destroy ‘labor power’. Because what is ‘labor power’? It is 
the children. If children are not brought up and educated anymore, what 
will become of the future? There will be: No future. This is what the 
young people say: there is no future. And now capitalism begins to under-
stand this. 
PL: You think so? 
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BS: I think so, yes. Of course it is not possible for them to tell that in the 
public sphere. But I have experienced it myself, when I created Ars Indus-
trialis. Everybody in the establishment said: they are completely silly, Neo-
Marxist, Neo-Freudian crackpots. But now, with the crisis, in particular of 
General Motors, they came to us and said: ‘oh, that is interesting what 
you said, could you tell us what you mean precisely’? So there is a change 
going on. Now, about software, Free Software. There are different levels of 
free organizations. There are the radically free organizations like The Free 
Software Foundation founded by Stallman… 
PL: You think Richard Stallman is a radical? 
BS: Maybe not so radical, but there are different types of organization. 
When Google works with Free Software, of course it is not really a Free 
Software organization, it is an Open Source organization, which is captur-
ing the sources of profit produced by the people. But nevertheless it is a 
change. It is a change which is very interesting. Maybe the main question 
about the future today is: what will be the next ‘historical compromise’? 
Maybe there will be one between radical Free Software activities and the 
Open Source economy. Because I think that even if you don’t have a gen-
eralization of Free Software production now already, it is clear that it 
points toward the future. Last year for example, Microsoft opened its 
sources to the software community. And this change was decided by Mi-
crosoft because it was clear for them that it was impossible to remain in-
scribed in the new culture of software without opening their platform to 
the Free Software Foundation.  
PL: Like IBM already did earlier. 
BS: Like IBM, yes. And here it is extremely important to be pragmatic. 
You need to have principles of course, very strong principles, but you 
need to allow for compromises as well.  
PL: You refer to a kind of peer-to-peer production model here? 
BS: Yes, it is a peer-to-peer production model. And this is extremely im-
portant, because it is a complete change of the industrial model. The in-
dustrial model of the twentieth century was based on an opposition be-
tween production and consumption. And the whole organization of 
marketing was based on this opposition. If you change this opposition, 
you change the whole system. And this is extremely interesting. Now you 
have a social democratic theory of this change, a capitalist theory, a Marx-
ist theory, a Post-Marxist theory, etcetera, but this is what is changing. 
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1 See for more information Ars Industrialis’ website: http://arsindustrialis.org/. 
2 For Stiegler, technology has to be understood first of all in terms of a memory, i.e., as a 
supplemental memory system unique to humans. Besides an individual neural and a 
specific (species) genetic memory, common to all sexualized living organisms, humans 
possess a third, technological memory or inheritance system which has enabled the 
transmission of individual experience over the generations, i.e., the possibility of indi-
vidual experience becoming available for the species at large thanks to its inscription in 
technical artefacts (opening the historical mode of being Heidegger called ‘existence’). 
Humanity has evolved on the basis of this technological inheritance system. This means 
that human evolution cannot be understood anymore in Darwinist terms, since Dar-
winian evolution presupposes that individual experience – ‘acquired characteristics’ – 
cannot be transmitted to the species. 
3 Stiegler uses this expression here in its Foucaultian sense of ‘care of the self’ [souci de soi] 
via technologies of the self [techniques de soi]. 
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